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Criminal Law
by Thomas D. Church *
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article provides a comprehensive review of the Eleventh Circuit’s
most noteworthy criminal law opinions from 2020, with a focus on the
key holdings from each decision.1 Section II of this Article addresses
substantive criminal offenses, such as economic crimes, drug offenses,
and firearm offenses, while Section III covers criminal procedure, the
rules of evidence, and constitutional issues arising in criminal
prosecutions. Section IV deals with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and other sentencing issues, and Section V provides a limited review of
the Eleventh Circuit’s decisions in post-conviction proceedings.
II. SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSES
A. Economic Crimes
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued
several important opinions involving fraud, theft of government
property, and other economic offenses. Several of these opinions included
matters of first impression or clarified the elements for certain offenses.
In United States v. Graham,2 for example, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed
as a matter of first impression the elements for corruptly endeavoring to
obstruct the administration of the Internal Revenue Code under 26
U.S.C. § 7212(a)3 in light of the United States Supreme Court’s holding

* Trial Attorney at Pate, Johnson & Church, LLC, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory University
(B.A. 2012). University of Georgia School of Law (J.D. 2017). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
Tom is also the author of thefederaldocket.com, a law blog dedicated to highlighting
noteworthy circuit court opinions and news in the area of federal criminal law.
1 For an analysis of last year’s criminal law and federal sentencing guidelines during
the survey period, see Thomas D. Church, Criminal Law, 2019 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 71
MERCER L. REV. 967 (2020).
2 981 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2020).
3 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).
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in Marinello v. United States,4 where the Court held that, in addition to
proving that a defendant knowingly and corruptly tried to obstruct or
impede the due administration of the internal revenue laws, the
Government must also prove “a nexus between the defendant’s conduct
and a particular administrative proceeding, such as an investigation, an
audit, or other targeted administrative action.”5 Graham submitted a
falsified “international bill of exchange” to satisfy an outstanding tax
liability, and the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the IRS’s “collection
activity” against Graham qualified as a “particular administrative
proceeding” given it was a “targeted administrative action” and included
the IRS sending Graham multiple lien and levy notices and confiscating
and selling some of Graham’s assets after Graham only made small
payments.6
Similarly, in United States v. Bazantes,7 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
a second-tier subcontractor’s conviction for making false statements
under 18 U.S.C. § 10018 based on falsified payroll records the defendant
submitted to the primary contractor.9 After an extensive discussion of the
legislative history of § 1001(a) and the Copeland Act, which imposes
certain requirements on contractors and subcontractors working on
federal construction projects, the court held that the falsified payroll
documents were made or used “in a matter within the jurisdiction” of the
federal government.10 The court also rejected the defendant’s argument
that the statements were not material since the statements were not
submitted directly to the government agency.11
In United States v. Maher,12 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
defendant’s conviction, under 18 U.S.C. § 641,13 for receiving, concealing,
or retaining government property.14 The court rejected Maher’s
argument that his prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations
because five years had passed since he had fraudulently obtained the
federal grant money at issue, holding that the act of “retaining” or
“possessing” is continuous and “is not complete until the possessor parts
138 S. Ct. 1101, 1109 (2018).
Graham, 981 F.3d at 1257 (citing Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1109).
6 Id. at 1257–60.
7 978 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2020).
8 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
9 Id. at 1231.
10 Id. 1236–45.
11 Id. at 1247–48.
12 955 F.3d 880 (11th Cir. 2020).
13 18 U.S.C. § 641.
14 Maher, 955 F.3d at 882.
4
5

2021]

CRIMINAL LAW

1095

with the item,” comparing Maher’s offense to other continuous offenses
like unlawful possession of a firearm or controlled substance.15 Because
“the crime of retaining property unlawfully is not complete until the
holder relinquishes the property to its rightful owner . . . . Maher’s
offense of retaining government property continued so long as he
possessed the federal grant money.”16
In United States v. Melgen,17 the Court for the Eleventh Circuit
considered the standard for proving the “materiality” of a false statement
in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United Health Services, Inc. v.
United States ex rel. Escobar,18 where the Court held that materiality, at
least in the False Claims context, “looks to the effect on the likely or
actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged misrepresentation.”19 The
Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court
should have used this language in its jury instructions rather than the
“capable of influencing” language in the pattern instructions, holding
that (1) the definition of materiality set forth in Escobar is not
inconsistent with the “objective standard that our current materiality
standard is based on,” and (2) to the extent that Escobar created a
heightened materiality standard, that standard is limited to false claims
based on “implied false certification[s],” not all criminal fraud cases.20
In another healthcare fraud case, United States v. Chalker,21 the
Eleventh Circuit considered the type of evidence sufficient under 18
U.S.C. §§ 1347 and 134922 to convict a defendant of conspiracy and
substantive counts of healthcare fraud.23 Regarding the conspiracy count,
the court held that there was sufficient evidence based on witnesses
testifying about the numerous “red flags” they found when conducting
audits of Chalker’s pharmacy, including the fact that a majority of the
pharmacy’s customers were from out of state, the high price of the
prescriptions, complaints from patients, and discrepancies in billing and
inventory.24 Regarding the substantive counts, the court held there was

Id. at 886 (citing United States v. D’Angelo, 819 F.2d 1062, 1066 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Maher, 955 F.3d at 886.
17 967 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2020).
18 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).
19 Melgen, 967 F.3d at 1259 (citing Escobar, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2002).
20 Melgen, 967 F.3d at 1259–60.
21 966 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2020).
22 18 U.S.C. §§ 1347, 1349.
23 Chalker, 966 F.3d at 1182.
24 Id. at 1185–88.
15
16
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sufficient evidence based on witnesses testifying that they were given
medically unnecessary medicine.25
In United States v. Grow,26 the Court for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
another defendant’s healthcare fraud conviction for recruiting Tricare
beneficiaries as patients to request pain creams, scar creams, and
vitamins that were not medically necessary.27 Although Grow argued
that bona fide doctors had issued valid prescriptions based on their
medical judgment, the court countered defendant’s argument and held
that a prescription is not a “get-out-of-jail-free card” and recounted the
numerous patient-witnesses who testified that they did not need the
prescriptions and had only participated to get paid by Grow’s
marketers.28 Also, the court held there was sufficient evidence of Grow’s
intent to defraud and “deliberate indifference” to whether the medical
products were medically necessary, noting that Grow’s marketers told
doctors what to prescribe and prepared prefilled prescriptions. Moreover,
Grow himself instructed marketers to always get the most expensive
products and knew that a recruit received scar cream despite not having
a scar.29
The Eleventh Circuit also issued a pair of important opinions involving
violations of the federal “Anti-kickback” statute,30 which prohibits
providers from receiving kickbacks, bribes, or other benefits in return for
referrals for, or purchases of, certain items and services billable to federal
healthcare programs.31 In United States v. Shah,32 the court held that a
conviction under the anti-kickback statute does not require any proof of
the defendant’s motivation for accepting the kickbacks, though the court
recognized that “motive matters for the payor crime even though it does
not for the payee crime.”33
In United States v. Ruan,34 a “pill-mill” and healthcare fraud case, the
Eleventh Circuit issued a rare reversal for the defendant’s conviction
under the anti-kickback statute.35 The court held there was insufficient
evidence to support one of the illegal kickback convictions due to
Id. at 1188–89.
977 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2020).
27 Id. at 1321.
28 Id. at 1317–22.
29 Id. at 1322.
30 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2021).
31 Id.
32 981 F.3d 920 (11th Cir. 2020).
33 Id. at 926.
34 966 F.3d 1101 (11th Cir. 2020).
35 Id. at 1120.
25
26
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insufficient evidence that the fraud involved a “[f]ederal health care
program.”36 The evidence showed that the defendants’ operation involved
a workers’ compensation dispensary that billed the Department of Labor
(DOL) but did not show that prescriptions were paid for by DOL, and the
Government could not provide any other “indication that federal monies
actually passed through the dispensary.”37
The Eleventh Circuit also issued a noteworthy opinion in United
States v. Singer38 regarding the mens rea requirement for criminal
violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA)39 in a case where the defendant was charged with exporting
modems to Cuba.40 As a matter of first impression, the court held that a
conviction for unlawful exportation under 50 U.S.C. § 1705, which
criminalizes “willful” violations of the IEEPA, requires evidence that a
defendant actually knew they were violating the law because “the
exportation of goods from the United States is not so obviously evil or
inherently bad that the willfulness requirement is satisfied.”41 At
defendant’s trial, however, the court held there was sufficient evidence
to prove defendant’s knowledge based on defendant receiving multiple
warnings to comply with commerce regulations and licensing
requirements, in addition to defendant’s letters discussing such
requirements.42 The defendant also traveled with the modems in a
hidden compartment and did not declare them to officials.43
Additionally, the court rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court
erred in declining to adopt their proposed jury instruction that “in this
case ignorance of the law is a defense to crimes charged against the
defendant” based on the mens rea requirement.44 Thus, the trial court
appropriately instructed the jury it had to find that “the Defendant knew
that exportation or sending of the merchandise was contrary to law or
regulation,” which was an accurate statement of law that captured the
substance of defendant’s proposed instruction.45

Id. at 1144–45.
Id. at 1145–46.
38 963 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 2020).
39 50 U.S.C.S §§ 1701–1708 (2021).
40 Singer, 963 F.3d at 1148–49.
41 Id. at 1157–58.
42 Id. at 1158.
43 Id. at 1158–59.
44 Id. at 1161–62.
45 Id. at 1162–63.
36
37
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In United States v. Caldwell,46 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
defendant’s conviction for bank robbery, holding that, while the
Government should “ideally” provide evidence of a bank’s
“contemporaneously held [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation]
(FDIC) insurance” to satisfy the jurisdictional element under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113,47 there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction. Such
evidence included a FDIC certificate from seventeen years before the
offense, witness testimony that the bank was consistently and current on
its insurance payments, and the “universal presumption . . . that all
banks are federal insured.”48 The court repeatedly emphasized the low
threshold for proving a bank’s insured status under § 2113.49
Finally, in United States v. McGregor,50 an access device fraud case,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court did not err in allowing
evidence of the defendant’s firearm, which included the firearm itself,
photos of the defendant holding the firearm with cash, and the fact that
the gun was found near the defendant’s personal identifying information
(PII) at issue in the case.51 The court held that evidence of the firearm—
which had the defendant’s fingerprints on it—was relevant to tying the
defendant to the PII and establishing their possession of it, and that it
did not unfairly prejudice the defendant given its “substantial probative
force” in undermining defendant’s “wrong place at the wrong time”
defense.52 The court added that “the possession of a firearm today is not
so inherently prejudicial as to necessarily outweigh its probative value.”53
B. Drug Offenses
The Eleventh Circuit issued several notable opinions regarding drug
offenses during this survey period. In United States v. Davila-Mendoza,54
for example, the court held that the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
(MDLEA)55 was unconstitutional as applied to the defendants, who were
foreign nationals while aboard a foreign vessel in the territorial waters

963 F.3d 1067 (11th Cir. 2020).
18 U.S.C. § 2113.
48 Caldwell, 963 F.3d at 1076–78 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Munskgard,
913 F.3d 1327, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2019)).
49 Id. at 1077–78.
50 960 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2020).
51 Id. at 1322.
52 Id. at 1323–25.
53 Id. at 1325.
54 972 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2020).
55 46 U.S.C. § 70501 (2021).
46
47
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of Jamaica.56 The court held that the MDLEA was not a valid exercise of
Congressional power under Article I’s Foreign Commerce Clause or the
Necessary and Proper Clause in this case, reasoning that the MDLEA
did not reflect any congressional findings regarding international drug
trafficking’s effect on foreign commerce, there was no evidence
connecting the defendants or their vessels to the United States, and the
MDLEA predated the United States treaty with Jamaica regarding
illegal trafficking.57
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendants’
constitutional challenges to the MDLEA in United States v.
Cabezas-Montano.58 The court held that the MDLEA is a valid exercise
of Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause, that the Due Process
Clause does not prohibit charging aliens captured on the high seas
because the MDLEA provides notice to all nations, and that the
MDLEA’s jurisdictional requirement is not a substantive element of the
offense and thus does not have to be submitted to a jury.59 The Eleventh
Circuit upheld the trial court’s jurisdiction because the defendants did
not claim a nationality for the vessel (though the vessel was later tied to
Ecuador), and then held that it was not plain error for the Government
to delay seven weeks before presenting the defendant before a court after
his arrest or for the Government to comment on the defendant’s
post-arrest silence.60
Around the same time, the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in
United States v. Tigua,61 where it considered as a matter of first
impression whether defendants, who had pleaded guilty to violations
under the MDLEA but had not yet been sentenced at the time the First
Step Act62 was passed, were eligible for safety valve relief under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(f), which the First Step Act amended to include MDLEA
offenses.63 The court concluded that the defendants were ineligible
because their convictions had been “entered” when the district court
accepted their guilty pleas.64 Both the Government and the defendants
had argued that “conviction entered” under the First Step Act referred to

Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d at 1277–78.
Id. at 1274–78.
58 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020).
59 Id. at 586–87.
60 Id. at 590–612.
61 963 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2020).
62 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
63 Tigua, 963 F.3d at 1142.
64 Id. at 1142–43.
56
57
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the “judgment of conviction,” which includes “the plea, the verdict or
findings, the adjudication, and the sentence.”65
The Eleventh Circuit also issued a trio of important opinions in cases
involving “pill mills.” In United States v. Gayden,66 the court held that
Dr. Gayden did not have standing to challenge law enforcement’s
warrantless search, via administrative subpoena, of automated
prescription records maintained in Florida’s Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program (PDMP).67 The court reasoned that Dr. Gayden did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the prescriptions he wrote
for his patients in part because he “voluntarily disclosed those
prescription records to others through his participation in the
computerized tracking system.”68 Moreover, the court also rejected Dr.
Gayden’s argument that the Government’s expert testimony should have
been excluded because the witness reviewed inflammatory material
about Dr. Gayden before forming his opinion, and defense counsel’s
“difficult tactical decision” whether to ask about the witness about the
inflammatory material and his potential bias on cross-examination was
“not the kind of Hobson’s choice that mandates striking the expert from
testifying.”69
In United States v. Benjamin,70 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a
doctor-defendant’s conviction for multiple counts of unlawfully
distributing opioids, including one that resulted in a person’s death.71
The court held there was sufficient evidence to show that Dr. Benjamin’s
unlawful prescriptions were the “but-for” cause of a victim’s overdose
death where an expert toxicologist testified that the victim tested positive
for fentanyl and had no underlying conditions that could have caused her
death, and the fentanyl was linked to Dr. Benjamin via text messages on
the victim’s phone to her dealer, who in turn got the fentanyl from Dr.
Benjamin.72 Additionally, agents had seized a pill press from Dr.
Benjamin’s home and storage unit and found internet search history
involving fentanyl.73 The court also rejected Dr. Benjamin’s arguments
that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it must find that Dr.

Id. at 1142 (citing Judgment of Conviction, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)).
977 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2020).
67 Id. at 1152.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1153.
70 958 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 2020).
71 Id. at 1128.
72 Id. at 1131–32.
73 Id. at 1132.
65
66
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Benjamin knew furanyl fentanyl was a “controlled substance analogue,”
holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in McFadden v. United
States74 allows the Government to prove intent by showing the defendant
either knew he was dealing with a controlled substance analogue or knew
the identity of the substance he possessed, even if he did not know its
status as an analogue.75
Finally, in United States v. Iriele,76 the Court affirmed the conviction
for a pharmacist accused of conspiring with an alleged “pill mill” to
unlawfully dispense controlled substances.77 The court held there was
sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish the conspiracy based on
the extensive contact between the pharmacy and the alleged pill mill,
especially regarding the kinds of prescriptions issued and those in stock,
the disproportionate amount and kind of prescriptions the pharmacy
filled from the alleged pill mill, the fact that other pharmacies would not
fill prescriptions from the alleged pill mill, and evidence that the
pharmacy’s customers coming from the alleged pill mill “exhibited signs
of being drug addicts.”78 Essentially, the pharmacist was exposed to
many of the same “red flags” that are generally sufficient to find a
doctor-defendant’s participation in a “pill mill” conspiracy.79
The court did hold, however, that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury that the standard for proving unlawful dispensation under 21
U.S.C. § 84180 is the same for pharmacists as applied to physicians
because the proper standard is actually whether the pharmacist “filled a
prescription knowing that a physician issued the prescription without a
legitimate medical purpose or outside the usual course of professional
practice.”81 However, the court concluded that the defendant did not meet
the third prong under the plain error analysis, given overwhelming
evidence of his knowledge.82
The Eleventh Circuit also published opinions involving more
conventional drug offenses. In United States v. Amede,83 a drug
conspiracy case where the defendant acted as an intermediary for a drug

135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015).
Benjamin, 958 F.3d at 1133–34 (citing McFadden, 135 S. Ct. at 2305).
76 977 F.3d 1155, 1169–70 (11th Cir. 2020).
77 Id. at 1169–70.
78 Id. at 1169–72.
79 Id. at 1171.
80 21 U.S.C. § 841.
81 Iriele, 977 F.3d at 1180.
82 Id.
83 977 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 2020).
74
75
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transaction between his unindicted co-conspirator and an undercover
officer, the court held that the district court properly admitted
out-of-court statements made by a co-conspirator to the officer before the
defendant had joined in the conspiracy.84 The court held the statements
were not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(E),85 despite the defendant not
being part of the conspiracy at the time the statements were made, and
that the Government had proved the existence of a conspiracy by a
preponderance of the evidence before introducing the statements.86 The
court noted that the Government’s evidence included the co-conspirator
referring to the defendant as “my guy,” his detailing how “my guy” would
travel to meet with the purchaser, the defendant’s statement to the
officer referring to himself as his co-conspirator’s “guy,” and the
defendant’s contact between the co-conspirator and officer after that
point.87
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court did not err
in limiting the defendant’s testimony or cross-examination of the agent
regarding post-arrest statements that the defendant argued would have
corroborated his defense of duress.88 The court held that the defendant
failed to carry his burden of proving that he “had no reasonable
opportunity to escape or inform law enforcement” as required to establish
a duress defense, and it was not enough that the defendant had a
“subjective and general lack of faith in law enforcement” to protect him
or his family.89 The court also made clear that, despite the language in
the indictment alleging the defendant acted “knowingly and willfully,”
the Government was not required to prove “willfulness” under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841.90
In United States v. Mancilla-Ibarra,91 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
denial of the defendant’s suppression motion where there was probable
cause to arrest a defendant drug supplier based on information obtained
from a government informant.92 The defendant was arrested while
attempting
to
deliver
methamphetamine
to
another
dealer-turned-informant who the Government had been able to secure

Id. at 1097–98.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
86 Iriele, 977 F.3d at 1097–98.
87 Id. at 1098.
88 Id. at 1102.
89 Id. at 1103.
90 Id. at 1099–1100.
91 947 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2020).
92 Id. at 1345.
84
85
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based on yet another, third informant’s tips. The court held the
information provided by the informant was reliable based on his personal
observations of the defendant’s criminal activity, his consent for officers
to search his home, his voluntarily turning over drug proceeds, and video
surveillance corroborating some of the information he provided.93
C. Firearm Offenses
The Eleventh Circuit ruled on several important issues arising in
prosecutions of federal firearm offenses, especially those under Rehaif v.
United States,94 where the Supreme Court held that a conviction for
unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)95 requires proof
that a defendant knew of their “unlawful status” that prohibited
possession of firearms.96
For example, in United States v. Johnson,97 the Eleventh Circuit
considered whether to vacate the defendant’s conviction for possession of
a firearm by a domestic violence misdemeanant in light of Rehaif, holding
that it was plain error for the indictment to fail to allege that the
defendant had knowledge of his prohibited status and to convict the
defendant without sufficient evidence of that knowledge.98 The court
affirmed defendant’s conviction, holding as a matter of first impression
that a conviction under § 922(g) based on a defendant’s misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence requires proof that the defendant knows (1)
that he has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime; (2) that the
conviction required that he knowingly or recklessly engaged in at least
the slightest offensive touching; and (3) that the victim of his
misdemeanor crime was his current or former spouse, parent, or
guardian.99
Here, the court held that the plain errors did not affect defendant’s
substantial rights because the evidence established that defendant knew
that he had previously been convicted of domestic battery in Florida, that
the victim was his wife, that he had served six months for that conviction,
and that he knew he was a misdemeanant, albeit did not know that
meant he could not possess firearms.100 The court also rejected
Id. at 1349–50.
139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).
95 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
96 Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2196–98.
97 981 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2020).
98 Id. at 1179–81.
99 Id. at 1183.
100 Id. at 1188–89.
93
94

1104

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

defendant’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g) as applied to
misdemeanants convicted of domestic violence.101
In United States v. Innocent,102 the Eleventh Circuit rejected Rehaif
challenges from the defendants based on their inability to prove that
their substantial rights were affected by the failure of the Government to
allege or prove knowledge of their prohibited status.103 Regarding the
first defendant, the court emphasized that most “people convicted of a
felony know that they are felons” and the defendant in this case had been
convicted of four felonies before, despite the fact that the defendant never
served more than a year in prison, and rejected that defendant’s
argument that his low IQ score did not show he “could not understand
that he was a felon.”104 Regarding the second defendant, the court relied
on the evidence that the defendant had previously told an officer that he
was a felon, he had already been convicted once of possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, he had previously spent years in prison, and he
behaved in a way that suggested he knew he couldn’t own a gun when
police approached him.105 Similarly, in United States v. Moore,106 the
Eleventh Circuit held that the failure to allege the defendant’s knowledge
in the indictment did not deprive the district court of subject matter
jurisdiction and that this plain error did not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights based on evidence that he had previously served a long
sentence and stipulated that he had a prior felony.107
However, the Eleventh Circuit did reverse at least one defendant’s
convictions based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Rehaif. In United
States v. Russell,108 the Eleventh Circuit vacated a defendant’s conviction
after he established plain error in the Government’s failure to allege or
prove that he had knowledge of “his status as a person barred from
possessing a firearm.”109 The court concluded that the defendant met his
burden of showing his substantial rights were affected because he had
“consistently challenged the nature of his immigration status throughout
the district court proceedings,” he had made statements that he believed
he was in the U.S. legally, and the district court had excluded evidence

Id. at 1191.
977 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2020).
103 Id. at 1079.
104 Id. at 1082–83.
105 Id. at 1083–84.
106 954 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2020).
107 Id. at 1336.
108 957 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2020).
109 Id. at 1250.
101
102
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he sought to admit at trial regarding his applications for immigration
relief and his belief that he was legally present in the U.S.110
The Eleventh Circuit considered other issues arising from firearm
offenses. In United States v. Bolatete,111 a case where a defendant was
convicted of possessing an unregistered firearm silencer and was
preparing to engage in a mass shooting at a mosque, the Eleventh Circuit
held that National Firearms Act112 does not exceed Congress’s authority
to levy taxes or violate the Second Amendment through its ban on
unregistered silencers.113
Also, the court held there was sufficient evidence of the defendant’s
predisposition to buy an unregistered silencer, despite his initial
reluctance to buy the silencer from the undercover officer and his
statements that a silencer would not be necessary for the mosque
shooting.114 Based on evidence that he knew a lot about silencers, the
defendant told the undercover officer he owned one before and shot
someone with it, and he was “the first one to mention an unregistered
silencer” and advised the undercover officer not to register his silencer.115
In another case involving an unregistered firearm, United States v.
Wilson,116 the Eleventh Circuit held that because there was sufficient
evidence of the defendant’s knowledge that his sawed-off shotgun was
less than twenty-six inches in overall length and had a barrel less than
eighteen inches long, the Government did not have to prove knowledge
that the gun was unregistered or that possession of the firearm was
unlawful.117
In United States v. McLellan,118 a defendant’s conviction for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the trial court did not err in allowing an agent to testify that the
under-a-gram quantity of methamphetamine found near the firearms
was a “sellable amount.”119 The court reasoned that in cases where a
defendant denies knowingly possessing a firearm, “evidence of possession
of illegal drugs is relevant in determining whether a defendant

Id. at 1253–54.
977 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir. 2020).
112 26 U.S.C. § 53.
113 Bolatete, 977 F.3d at 1035–36.
114 Id. at 1036–37.
115 Id.
116 979 F.3d 889 (11th Cir. 2020).
117 Id. at 904–05.
118 958 F.3d 1110 (11th Cir. 2020).
119 Id. at 1115.
110
111
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knowingly possessed a weapon found in close proximity to drugs.”120
Additionally, the methamphetamine was found near a digital scale,
several baggies, and other items associated with distribution.121
D. Violent Crimes and the Armed Career Criminal Act
The Eleventh Circuit issued several important opinions clarifying the
scope of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)122 and other violent
crimes. In United States v. Green,123 the court reversed the defendants’
convictions for carrying a firearm in connection with a crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),124 holding as a matter of first impression that a
RICO conspiracy is not categorically a “crime of violence.”125 The court
reasoned that, as with a Hobbs Act126 robbery conspiracy, “the elements
of a RICO conspiracy focus on the agreement to commit a crime, which
does not necessitate the existence of a threat or attempt to use force.”127
Conversely, in United States v. De Andre Smith,128 the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed defendant’s conviction for Hobbs Act robbery involving
multiple armed robberies and a carjacking.129 The court held there was
sufficient evidence of the element requiring defendant’s conduct to have
an “actual effect” on interstate commerce when he robbed a victim who
owned a business that was engaged in interstate commerce, took items
used in connection with her business, including a thumb drive, cell
phone, and cash, and the court concluded that there did not have to be
any “commercial relationship” between the defendant and a victim to
sustain a conviction under the Hobbs Act.130 The court also rejected
Smith’s argument that the fact that the victim is an individual limits the
theories under which the Government can charge and convict a
defendant for Hobbs Act robbery.131

Id. (citing United States v. Thomas, 242 F.3d 1028, 1031 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Id. at 1115–16.
122 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2021).
123 981 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2020).
124 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
125 Green, 981 F.3d at 952.
126 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
127 Green, 981 F.3d at 952, (citing Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th
Cir. 2019)).
128 967 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2020).
129 Id. at 1200.
130 Id. at 1208–10.
131 Id. at 1207–08.
120
121
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In United States v. Gumbs,132 where the defendant was convicted of
using a deadly weapon—his car—to forcibly assault, resist, oppose,
impede, intimidate, or interfere with federal officers, the court affirmed
the defendant’s conviction.133 The court held there was sufficient
evidence where the defendant was a fugitive on the run, used his car to
escape agents who had caught up to him, and hit or almost hit several of
them while escaping.134 The court also rejected defendant’s arguments
regarding his proposed jury instructions, which the trial court declined
to adopt, including those defining “forcibly,” explaining when a car
constitutes a “deadly weapon” because 18 U.S.C. § 111(b)135 is a general
intent crime.136 Therefore, the court had no obligation to instruct the jury
that the defendant had to intend to use the car as a deadly weapon to
warrant a conviction.137 Similarly, in United States v. Bates,138 the
Eleventh Circuit ruled on an issue of first impression that an assault on
a federal officer through use of a deadly weapon or by inflicting bodily
injury under § 111(b) categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c).139
The Eleventh Circuit also focused on the ACCA in several published
opinions during this survey period. In United States v. Carter,140 the court
considered whether a defendant’s prior convictions for distributing
marijuana and distributing cocaine, which were alleged in a single
indictment, were independent offenses for the purposes of qualifying him
as a “career criminal” under the ACCA.141 Looking at the indictment and
plea transcript142 from the prior case, the court found that the offenses
were “more likely than not” committed “on occasions different from one
another.”143 Because the indictment alleged a location-based
enhancement for distributing drugs near a school or public housing in

964 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1350–51.
134 Id. at 1351.
135 18 U.S.C. § 111(b).
136 Gumbs, 964 F.3d at 1347–48.
137 Id.
138 960 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020).
139 Id. at 1287.
140 969 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2020).
141 Id. at 1241.
142 The court added that it may not have been appropriate for the district court to rely
on the plea transcript because the defendant had not “confirmed” the factual basis for the
plea. Id. at 1243.
143 Id. at 1243–44.
132
133
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only one of the counts, the court concluded that the offenses “most likely
happened at different places and, by extension, different times.”144
In Welch v. United States,145 the Eleventh Circuit held that the
defendant’s prior Florida convictions for strong-arm robbery and felony
battery were violent felonies under the elements clause of the ACCA
because they required more than “mere snatching.”146 In United States v.
Oliver,147 the defendant was sentenced under the ACCA based on his
prior conviction under Georgia law for making terroristic threats.148 The
court held that the statute was divisible and “a threat to commit ‘any
crime of violence’ under Georgia law” is always a violent felony under the
ACCA.149 In United States v. Smith,150 the court held that the defendant’s
prior Florida conviction for sale of cocaine was a “serious drug offense”
under the ACCA and rejected his argument that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel based on his counsel’s plea negotiations in the
concurrent state and federal cases.151 In Hollis v. United States,152 the
court held that the defendant’s Alabama convictions for distributing
cocaine were predicate “serious drug offense[s]” and so was his Georgia
conviction for trafficking cocaine.153
E. Immigration Crimes
The Eleventh Circuit issued three important opinions regarding
immigration offenses. In United States v. Estrada,154 the defendants were
convicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)155 for bringing four noncitizen
baseball players to the United States, and the defendants argued on
appeal that their conduct was legal under the Cuban Adjustment Act and
Wet Foot/Dry Foot Policy, which protects Cubans who come to the
country and allows them to apply for permanent residency.156 The court
rejected this argument, and held that the Act and Policy did not provide

Id. at 1245.
958 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2020).
146 Id. at 1095–98.
147 962 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2020).
148 Id. at 1314.
149 Id. at 1314–15.
150 983 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020).
151 Id. at 1220–21.
152 958 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 2020).
153 Id. at 1122.
154 969 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2020).
155 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).
156 Estrada, 969 F.3d at 1259.
144
145
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the defendants with “prior official authorization” to enter or reside in the
United States.157 Additionally, the court held there was sufficient
evidence to support their convictions for aiding and abetting bringing an
alien to the United States under § 1342(a)(2), holding that “bringing” an
alien does not require “evidence of physical accompaniment across the
border” and that “it was enough that the defendants and other members
of the smuggling operation made all the arrangements for the players’
border crossings.”158
In United States v. Santos,159 the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the
defendant’s convictions for procuring naturalization unlawfully and
misuse of evidence of an unlawfully issued certificate of naturalization
based on the defendant failing to disclose on a Form N-400 Application
that he had previously been convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the
Dominican Republic.160 Defendant argued at trial that he had not
“knowingly” made the false statements because he thought that the
questions on the form regarding prior convictions only referred to
convictions in the United States, and they were not “material” to his
procuring naturalization.161 Regarding the knowledge element, the court
held there was sufficient evidence based on several other false
statements wherein defendant failed to disclose other illegal but
uncharged conduct he engaged in, his prior travel outside the United
States, and his use of another name. The court also noted that the form
asked for the “Country” of any arrests and charges.162 The court held that
the false statements were material, citing the disqualifying-fact theory
and investigation-based theory set forth in the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Maslenjak v. United States,163 because “a reasonable USCIS
officer adjudicating Santos’s Form N-400 Application, knowing about
Santos’s Dominican conviction, would have denied the Application.”164
Finally, in United States v. Jimenez,165 the court affirmed the
defendant’s conviction for immigration document fraud and money
laundering offenses based on the defendant submitting fraudulent

Id. at 1262–63.
Id. at 1268.
159 947 F.3d 711 (11th Cir. 2020).
160 Id. at 716–17.
161 Id. at 731.
162 Id. at 731–32.
163 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).
164 Santos, 947 F.3d at 732–34.
165 972 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2020).
157
158
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employer petitions in order to obtain work visas for Chinese nationals.166
The court held that the I-140 petitions qualify under 18 U.S.C. § 546(a)167
as an “other document required by the immigration laws or regulations”
and that the evidence was sufficient where the Government introduced
evidence that the defendant had paid individuals to submit petitions on
behalf of their business, lied about their businesses relationship with
Chinese businesses, and forged their names on the forms.168
F. Sex Offenses
Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit issued a pair of noteworthy opinions
involving sex offenses. In United States v. Caniff,169 the panel vacated a
prior opinion it had issued in 2019, wherein it held under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(d)(1)170 that a defendant sending text messages requesting nude
pictures from an undercover officer posing as a minor was guilty of
making a “notice” seeking or offering child pornography.171 This time
around, the court reversed Caniff’s conviction.172 The court reasoned that
the context of the statute focused more on advertising and publishing in
the media and other forms of “public communications.”173 In this context,
the word “notice” is ambiguous, and as such, the rule of lenity applies
and precludes § 2251(d)(1) from reaching “private, person-to-person text
messages” requesting or offering child pornography.174
In United States v. Deason,175 the court considered whether under 18
U.S.C. § 1470,176 there was sufficient evidence to convict a defendant of
attempting to transfer obscene matter to a minor.177 At trial, the
Government had only introduced screenshots of videos that the
defendant had sent an undercover officer posing as a minor, along with
an agent’s testimony describing the contents of the videos, rather than
play the videos in its entirety.178 The defendant argued the evidence was
Id. at 1184.
18 U.S.C. § 546(a).
168 Jimenez, 972 F.3d at 1192–94.
169 955 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2020).
170 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1).
171 Caniff, 955 F.3d at 1185 (vacated, United States v. Caniff, 916 F.3d 929 (11th Cir.
2019)).
172 Caniff, 955 F.3d at 1185.
173 Id. at 1188–90.
174 Id. at 1191–92.
175 965 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2020).
176 18 U.S.C. § 1470.
177 Deason, 965 F.3d at 1262.
178 Id.
166
167
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insufficient, relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller v.
California,179 which lays out a three-part test for determining if a matter
is “obscene” based on:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.180

The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that Miller “does not require
that all the matter alleged to be obscene be admitted into evidence and
put before the trier of fact.”181 Rather, the court explained, Miller is about
ensuring “that the matter is placed in context” and “that any serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value present in the matter as a
whole is not lost because only select portions are viewed.”182 Here,
nothing was omitted from the screenshots or testimony that would have
given the videos redeeming value, the court reasoned, and the selected
portions in evidence were enough for the jury to conclude that the
underlying videos, “taken as a whole,” were obscene.183 The court also
rejected defendant’s arguments that the six counts of obscenity in the
indictment were flawed because they were based on the date the
materials were sent rather than each of the specific materials
themselves, that the admission of the screen shots and testimony
violated the best evidence rule and constituted reversible plain error, and
that, even assuming the obscenity counts were duplicitous, defendant
had not shown his substantial rights were prejudiced because he had not
made any argument “as to how a reasonable juror could conclude that
any of those images are not obscene.”184
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, AND THE U.S.

413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Deason, 965 F.3d at 1262 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1262–63.
183 Id. at 1263.
184 Id. at 1264–69.
179
180
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CONSTITUTION
A. Fourth Amendment Issues
The Fourth Amendment185 occupied a substantial amount of the
Eleventh Circuit’s time in 2020, with most of the court’s decisions cutting
against the suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence, including in
cases involving blatant violations of the Fourth Amendment. The
Supreme Court of the United States also declined to grant certiorari in
Williams v. United States,186 leaving intact a circuit split wherein the
Eleventh Circuit remains the sole circuit that does not require law
enforcement to have any level of suspicion before searching an
individual’s electronic device at the border.187
In United States v. Campbell,188 the panel vacated its own prior
opinion189 from January 2019 in which it held that an officer had
unlawfully prolonged a traffic stop under the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Rodriguez v. United States,190 where the Supreme Court held
that a traffic stop is unlawful as soon as the officer detains the motorist
longer than necessary to complete the purpose of the stop and there is no
reasonable suspicion to warrant further detaining them.191 This time
around, the Eleventh Circuit held that the good faith exception applied
because the officers were relying on then-binding case law.192 At the end
of the year, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the opinion and voted in favor
of granting a rehearing en banc.193
In United States v. Evans,194 the Eleventh Circuit upheld law
enforcement’s warrantless entry and protective sweep of a defendant’s
residence under the “emergency aid exception” to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.195 The court held that, under the
circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to believe—erroneously,
it turns out—that there was someone in the house in need of aid based

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
141 S.Ct. 235 (2020).
187 See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Vergara,
884 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2018).
188 970 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2020).
189 Id.
190 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
191 Id. at 1346 (citing Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1609).
192 Id.
193 United States v. Campbell, 981 F.3d 1014–15 (Mem) (11th Cir. 2020).
194 958 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 2020).
195 Id. at 1104–06.
185
186
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on hearing a whimpering dog, noting the officers were responding to 911
calls about gunshots, Evans’ girlfriend told them Evans had threatened
to kill himself inside, and once Evans did come outside, he locked the door
behind him.196
Similarly, in United States v. Yarbrough,197 the Eleventh Circuit
reversed a district court’s suppression order and held that the officers
were justified in executing a warrantless protective sweep of the
defendant’s house after they arrested the defendant in his yard and his
wife inside their house.198 The court held that the officers’ reentry after
the defendants were arrested was warranted because the totality of the
circumstances supported “a reasonable suspicion that a dangerous
individual was located inside the house,” citing the anonymous tip that
the house hosted drug trafficking, the number of vehicles at the house,
others hanging outside the house, and the “evasive or furtive behavior”
of the defendant’s wife when she tried to flee the officers.199
The Eleventh Circuit reversed another district court’s suppression
order in United States v. Watkins,200 a case involving a post office
supervisor who was smuggling narcotics through her branch and who
was discovered after agents put a tracking device in one of the narcotics
packages.201 Although the court acknowledged, and the Government
conceded, that the agents violated Watkins’ Fourth Amendment rights
when they activated and monitored the tracking device without a
warrant when the device was inside her home, the court held that the
inevitable discovery exception applied because there was a “reasonable
probability” that the agents would have eventually conducted a “knock
and talk” at Watkins’ house based on her status as a suspect, her anxious
appearance when they previously visited her office, and other similar
facts.202 The court added that the district court abused its discretion by
disregarding the credibility determinations of the magistrate judge
without conducting another hearing.203
Regarding electronic data, the Eleventh Circuit held in United States
v. Trader204 that the Government does not have to seek a search warrant

Id. at 1106–07.
961 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2020).
198 Id. at 1159.
199 Id. at 1163–65.
200 981 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2020).
201 Id. at 1228.
202 Id. at 1231–35.
203 Id. at 1234–35.
204 981 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2020).
196
197
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to request email addresses and IP addresses associated with a user’s
profile on social media applications, where the defendant allegedly
solicited naked pictures from someone he believed was a minor.205 The
court held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United
States,206 where the Court held that the third-party doctrine does not
excuse the Government from seeking a warrant before obtaining cell site
location data, does not extend to email or IP addresses.207 Unlike cell site
location data, a defendant’s email address and IP address as maintained
in a social media application are ordinary “business records” that do not
“directly record[] an individual’s location.”208
In United States v. Knights,209 the Eleventh Circuit considered
whether the officers had conducted an investigatory stop when they
approached the defendant and another person who were smoking
marijuana by a car.210 The court held that there was no investigatory stop
or “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment and that the encounter was
“initially consensual,” citing the fact that defendant was free to leave
(and his friend did leave), the officers did not display their weapons,
touch defendant or speak to him, and that they did not activate the lights
or sirens on their patrol car.211 The case was distinguishable to those
where officers approaching defendants have the practical effect of
cornering them or making them feel they are not free to leave.212
In United States v. Bruce,213 the officers conducted a Fourth
Amendment stop by tackling the defendant while he was allegedly fleeing
upon their approach. The court held that reasonable suspicion existed to
believe that the defendant had engaged in criminal activity based on the
officers receiving a 911 call from an anonymous tipster who claimed to be
an eye witness, the call coming late at night regarding individuals
engaged in an argument while in a high-crime area, and one of the
individuals with the defendant fleeing upon approach by the officers. 214
The court focused on the reliability of the tipster as well.215

Id. at 964.
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
207 Id. at 2217.
208 Trader, 981 F.3d at 968.
209 967 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2020).
210 Id. at 1268.
211 Id. at 1270–71.
212 Id. at 1271–72 (citing United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726, 727 (5th Cir. 1979)).
213 977 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 2020).
214 Id. at 1115, 1118–21.
215 Id. at 1118–1119.
205
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In United States v. Mastin,216 the Eleventh Circuit held officers did not
violate the Fourth Amendment by entering a hotel room to execute arrest
warrants which the defendant was not subject to.217 The court first
concluded that the officers’ entry into the hotel room was based on a
reasonable belief that the subjects of the arrest warrants were dwelling
at the hotel room.218 The court also held that the officers did not violate
defendant’s rights by forcing him to crawl out of the room, which revealed
a firearm he was prohibited from possessing, reasoning that the officers
were pursuing “violent felons who were known to be armed” and were
thus justified in detaining the defendant and forcing him to crawl on the
ground to ensure their own safety.219
However, not all of the Eleventh Circuit’s Fourth Amendment opinions
cut against defendants. In the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc opinion in
United States v. Ross,220 the court held that a suspect’s alleged
“abandonment” of property that is the object of a search or seizure still
has standing under Article III221 to challenge the search, as the alleged
abandonment of property “implicates only the merits of his Fourth
Amendment challenge.”222 Therefore, “if the government fails to argue
abandonment, it waives the issue.”223
B. Fifth Amendment Issues
The Eleventh Circuit broke ground in several opinions involving the
Fifth Amendment,224 including cases involving defendants’ Miranda
rights. One notable case was McKathan v. United States,225 where the
court vacated a defendant’s conviction for receipt of child pornography
and held that the statements he made to his probation officer while on
supervised release, which led to a revocation of his release and formed
the basis of a subsequent charge and conviction, were compelled in
violation of his Miranda rights.226 The court reasoned that the
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were “self-executing” because the

972 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1233.
218 Id. at 1236–37.
219 Id. at 1237–39.
220 963 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2020).
221 U.S. CONST. art. III.
222 Ross, 963 F.3d at 1057.
223 Id.
224 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
225 969 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020).
226 Id. at 1217.
216
217
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Government had created a “classic penalty situation” where in the
defendant had to either make incriminating statements to his probation
officer or violate his conditions of release.227 Thus, the statements could
be used to revoke the defendant’s supervised release but could not form
the basis of a new prosecution.228
In Deason, the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant was not in
custody when he made incriminating statements to agents after officers
executed a search warrant for the defendant’s phone.229 The court noted
that the defendant had agreed to talk to the officers after he was
repeatedly told he was not under arrest, he was told that the officers
could leave if asked, and he insisted on continuing to talk to the agents
after his wife advised him to stop talking.230
Several of the Eleventh Circuit’s other Fifth Amendment opinions
reflect how difficult it is for defendants to obtain reversals based on
Government misconduct and other due process issues. In United States
v. Gallardo,231 for example, the court affirmed a defendant’s conviction
and the trial court’s denial of motion for mistrial after an agent testified
falsely during the Government’s rebuttal in order to bolster the
credibility of a confidential source.232 Despite expressing significant
concern with the agent’s credibility, the trial court instead determined
that the agent could not provide any further rebuttal testimony and gave
a curative instruction to the jury to disregard the agent’s rebuttal
testimony in its entirety.233 The court held that, under these
circumstances, the testimony was not “so prejudicial that no instruction
could cure it.”234
Also, the panel in Gallardo concluded that the Government did not
plainly violate Brady v. Maryland235 or Giglio v. United States, 236 when
it disclosed, during trial, that the Government had deactivated their
confidential source witness based on self-dealing.237 The court reasoned
that there was no Brady violation because it was not reasonably probable
that the outcome of the case would have been different had the evidence
Id. at 1224–26.
Id. at 1229.
229 Deason, 965 F.3d at 1252.
230 Id. at 1260–62.
231 977 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir. 2020).
232 Id. at 1136.
233 Id. at 1136–37.
234 Id. at 1139.
235 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
236 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
237 Gallardo, 977 F.3d at 1142–43.
227
228
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been disclosed sooner, and there was no Giglio violation because the
evidence did not reveal that any of the Government’s witnesses had
testified falsely.238 The court also rejected the defendant’s motion for new
trial based on the Government engaging in sentencing factor
manipulation, where the Government “manipulates a sting operation to
increase a defendant’s sentence,” holding that the evidence showed the
defendant was a willing participant in finding additional drug quantities
for the confidential source and, in either case, the proper remedy would
be a sentence reduction rather than new trial.239
In Gayden, a “pill mill” case, the court affirmed the denial of a
defendant’s motion to dismiss based on pre-indictment delay despite the
fact that the defendant was prejudiced by his inability to call his mother
and former office manager as witnesses due to their death and by the
destruction of records obtained under administrative subpoenas.240
Based on the Government’s explanation that the two-year delay was
necessary so it could retain a new expert, and the defendant’s failure to
show “a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical
advantage over him,” the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion.241
In Moore, the court held that the shackling of the defendants during
their trial was not reversible plain error even though the record did not
reflect a “particularized determination of the security needs” necessary
to warrant shackling the defendants.242 The court reasoned that, putting
the apparent violation of due process aside, the defendant had failed to
meet his burden in showing that the outcome may have been different at
trial, citing the split verdict by the jury as an indication that the
presumption of innocence had not been “undermined” by the sight of the
defendants in shackles.243 The court did “admonish” trial courts to state
on the record why restraints are necessary.244

Id. at 1143.
Id. at 1144.
240 Gayden, 977 F.3d at 1150.
241 Id. at 1150–51.
242 Moore, 954 F.3d at 1329.
243 Id. at 1330.
244 Id.
238
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C. Sixth Amendment Issues
The Eleventh Circuit issued several opinions discussing the Sixth
Amendment245 right to counsel. In United States v. Muho,246 the court
affirmed a defendant’s conviction after the defendant argued that the
trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel “when he was
allowed to continue to represent himself, even after he vacillated about
self-representation.”247 Where the validity of the defendant’s waiver of
counsel was unchallenged, clearly voluntary, and “repeatedly reaffirmed
after signs of uncertainty,” the trial court did not err in failing “to
override sua sponte the defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel.”248
The Eleventh Circuit considered another right-to-counsel issue in
Amede,249 where the district court denied the defendant’s request for
counsel at sentencing after he had discharged two other attorneys.250 The
court held that the defendant had not established “good cause” where he
had refused to communicate with his trial attorney, his complaints
regarding that attorney were based on her refusal to file meritless pro se
motions, and his “general loss of confidence or trust” in his attorney was
not sufficient.251 Regarding the second attorney, who the defendant
retained before sentencing and then discharged him during the
sentencing hearing, the court held that the sentencing court did not err
in allowing the defendant to discharge his attorney and proceed pro se
without conducting a formal colloquy, despite the defendant repeatedly
stating that he needed counsel.252
The court held that the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel despite the statements he made after firing
his second attorney, noting that the district court had continued
sentencing twice to give the defendant’s attorney time to prepare, the
defendant refused to speak with his attorney at the hearing, the
defendant twice insisted on proceeding without that attorney, the district
court advised the defendant of the risks of proceeding without counsel,
and “the totality of the record.”253 The court added that the defendant’s
“uncooperative conduct throughout the case” reflected his knowing and
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
978 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2020).
247 Id. at 1217.
248 Id. at 1218.
249 977 F.3d at 1086.
250 Id. at 1104–05.
251 Id. at 1106–07.
252 Id. at 1110.
253 Id. at 1110–11.
245
246
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voluntary waiver and, while he at one point stated he had “other counsel
lined up,” he did not assert that such counsel was present and ready to
proceed with sentencing.254
In another case involving a pro se defendant, Wilson,255 the court held
that the defendant had knowingly waived his right to counsel when he
repeatedly refused to request a continuance when his standby counsel
was unavailable, hoping to let this speedy trial clock run.256 Similarly, in
United States v. Owen,257 the court held that the trial court did not err in
allowing the defendant to represent himself based on his knowing waiver,
noting that the defendant had articulated his knowledge and
voluntariness, he had no mental disability, he had formerly worked as a
paralegal, and he had been able to strike jurors, request preliminary
instructions, and persuade the trial court to exclude evidence.258 The
court did weigh the lack of standby counsel in defendant’s favor, however,
though it did not otherwise invalidate the valid waiver.259
The Eleventh Circuit also published a pair of important opinions
involving ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In Martin v. United
States,260 the court held that the defendant’s attorney was not
constitutionally ineffective based on the attorney’s failure to advise the
defendant that he would be deported if he pleaded guilty to access device
fraud and identity theft.261 Defense counsel had advised the defendant
that he could face “adverse immigration consequences,” but since it was
not certain that the defendant’s conviction would be an “aggravated
felony” until the loss amount was determined at sentencing, defense
counsel was not required to advise the defendant that he would be
pleading to an aggravated felony that made deportation presumptively
mandatory.262
Conversely, in Carmichael v. United States,263 the court held that the
defendant’s counsel was deficient in failing to advise the defendant of his
potential sentencing exposure, not making a plea offer to the government
as directed by the defendant, and not conveying the government’s

Id. at 1111.
979 F.3d at 889.
256 Id. at 913–14.
257 963 F.3d 1040 (11th Cir. 2020).
258 Id. at 1049–51.
259 Id. at 1051.
260 949 F.3d 662 (11th Cir. 2020).
261 Id. at 667.
262 Id. at 668–69.
263 966 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2020).
254
255
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time-limited plea offer.264 However, the court declined to vacate the
defendant’s conviction because he had not proven he was adversely
affected, citing defendant’s rejection of two prior plea offers and the lack
of evidence that he would have been able or willing to gain a reduction
through cooperating given his prior refusal to attend a proffer session.265
The court also ruled on other important Sixth Amendment issues. In
Moore,266 the court rejected a defendant’s challenge regarding juror
misconduct where the jurors had expressed safety concerns about putting
their names on the verdict form.267 The court explained that the “best
course of action” in such a situation is for the trial court to “confer with
counsel to discuss the contours of an in camera review,” interview the
juror or jurors in camera, summarize its assessment of the interviews on
the record for the parties, and having the court reporter read the
transcript of the in camera interview to the parties.268 In United States
v. Pon,269 the court held that a defendant potentially had a Sixth
Amendment right to present surrebuttal evidence but that the defendant
had failed to preserve the issue for appeal because he had raised an
objection on evidentiary grounds, not constitutional grounds, and denial
of a defendant’s surrebuttal was harmless based on sufficient evidence
that the jury’s verdict was not affected.270
D. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
The court discussed the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
several cases where those rules intersected with evidentiary rules and
constitutional issues, but it also addressed a few specific rules. In United
States v. Andres,271 for example, the court held that the district court did
not err inn denying the defendant’s motion to suppress as untimely
because the good cause exception to Rule 12’s272 timeliness requirement
does not apply to strategic delays or inadvertence.273

Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1260–61.
266 954 F.3d at 1322.
267 Id. at 1330–31.
268 Id. at 1331.
269 963 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2020).
270 Id. at 1225–28.
271 960 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2020).
272 FED. R. CIV. P. 12.
273 Andres, 960 F.3d at 1316.
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In United States v. Melgen,274 the court affirmed the denial of a
defendant’s motion for a new trial under Rule 33,275 holding that
defendant-favorable testimony rendered by the government’s expert at
the sentencing hearing was not new evidence warranting a new trial
because it could have been obtained before trial, on cross-examination,
and the evidence “at best” could have been used for impeachment
purposes only.276
E. Federal Rules of Evidence
The Eleventh Circuit addressed several different kinds of evidentiary
issues in 2020. The court’s decision in Santos,277 for example, involved
issues arising from the trial court’s admission of an annotated copy of the
Form N-400 Application that reflected corrections and clarifications that
the immigration officer made while interviewing the defendant, who was
convicted of procuring citizenship unlawfully based in part on his failure
to disclose a prior conviction for manslaughter.278 The court held that the
annotated form was admissible as non-hearsay statements adopted by an
opposing party and under the public records exception and that
admission of the form did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights
because the form was “nontestimonial public record produced as a matter
of administrative routine, . . . for the primary purpose of determining the
[defendant’s] eligibility for naturalization.”279
The court also affirmed the trial court’s decision to allow testimony
regarding an inculpatory portions of the defendant’s post-Miranda
statements but not the subsequent, exculpatory portions of the
statement.280 Defendant had revealed to an immigration officer that he
was previously convicted of manslaughter in another country, contrary
to his disclosure on immigration forms, but explained that he thought the
form referred only to convictions in the United States.281 The court
rejected the defendant’s argument that the exculpatory explanation
should have been admitted under the “rule of completeness” and Rule
106,282 holding that the facts of the defendant’s prior conviction and his
967 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2020).
FED. R. CIV. P. 33.
276 Melgen, 967 F.3d at 1264–65.
277 947 F.3d at 716.
278 Id. at 723–24.
279 Id. at 729.
280 Id. at 729–30.
281 Id. at 732.
282 FED. R. EVID. 106.
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subsequent explanation for failing to disclose were “separate and
different” topics, and the exculpatory portion “was not necessary to
explain or clarify the earlier inculpatory part.”283
In United States v. Clotaire,284 the court considered whether
photograph stills of an ATM surveillance video showing the defendant
were inadmissible testimonial hearsay.285 The court held that they were
admissible as business records, rejecting the defendant’s argument that
they ceased being business records when the Government isolated
certain images in the video for the purpose of litigation.286 The court also
held that the defense was not entitled to cross-examine the person who
prepared the stills.287
The court also considered whether the trial court erred in admitting a
picture of the defendant’s mugshot.288 The court reasoned that there was
a demonstrable need for the Government to introduce the mugshot
because the identification of the defendant was “central to the
government’s case,” there was no implication that it was from a prior
arrest, the parties had stipulated it was taken on the same day as the
defendant’s arrest, and the Government “did not draw attention to how
or under what circumstances the photographs were taken.”289
The court also issued important opinions regarding conventional
identification evidence. In Caldwell, the court held that the trial court
did not clearly err in admitting an out-of-court identification in a bank
robbery trial where officers brought a bank teller to the defendant
immediately upon his apprehension to conduct a “show-up
identification,” and the bank teller was only able to “point out similarities
between Caldwell and the robber [and] could not positively identify him
as the robber at that time.”290 The court held that, even assuming the
“show-up” procedure was unduly suggestive, it was nonetheless
sufficiently reliable under the circumstances, which included the teller’s
close visual contact with the robber, detailed description of the robber,
and her statements regarding the similarities between the defendant’s
appearance and that of the robber.291 The court also affirmed the district

Santos, 947 F.3d at 729–30.
963 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2020).
285 Id. at 1293.
286 Id. at 1293–94.
287 Id. at 1294–95.
288 963 F.3d 1288, 1299 (11th Cir. 2020).
289 Id. at 1300–02.
290 Caldwell, 963 F.3d at 1071.
291 Id. at 1075–76.
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court’s denial of defendant’s motion for new trial based on new evidence,
provided by the FBI after trial and establishing that the agent’s
testimony on DNA evidence was materially incorrect in several aspects,
because the non-DNA evidence was overwhelming.292
In Iriele, the court held that the trial court had properly admitted an
agent’s testimony identifying the defendant’s handwriting on a ledger
listing alleged money laundering transactions.293 The court hinged its
decision on finding that Rule 901(b)(2)294 did not preclude the testimony
because the agent’s opinion was based on familiarity with the defendant’s
handwriting that he obtained “in the course of investigating a crime,” and
it was not “acquired for the current litigation.”295 The court supported
this distinction by considering the purpose of the rule, which was
intended to prevent lay witnesses from testifying as experts, and
concluded that an agent
who becomes familiar with the defendant's handwriting for the
purpose of solving a crime is different from a lay witness who makes a
handwriting comparison so he can testify about it at trial. That
investigator is in the same position as any other lay witness who, as
part of his job or in his day-to-day affairs, has seen examples of the
defendant's handwriting.296

In United States v. Joseph,297 a heroin and fentanyl case, the court
considered whether the trial court had erred in admitting certain
evidence under Rules 403298 and 404(b)299 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.300 First, the court affirmed the trial court admitting evidence
that the defendant had used a false identity to rent an apartment despite
him not being charged with identity theft, holding the evidence was
“inextricably intertwined” with evidence of the drug charges because it
showed the defendant exercised control over the drugs in the property
and used the property to conceal his drug activity.301 The court also held

Id. at 1079–80.
Iriele, 977 F.3d at 1166.
294 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2).
295 Iriele, 977 F.3d at 1166.
296 Id. at 1167.
297 978 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2020).
298 FED. R. EVID. 403.
299 FED. R. EVID. 404.
300 Joseph, 978 F.3d at 1263.
301 Id.
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that the trial court properly admitted a detective’s testimony regarding
the dangers of fentanyl overdoses, holding that it was admissible under
Rule 403 because “Joseph was charged with a crime involving fentanyl,”
and he could not prove prejudice because “the general public already is
aware that heroin and fentanyl can be deadly.”302
In United States v. Smith,303 a case involving a violent robbery, the
court considered whether the district court erred in admitting a music
video into evidence that featured the defendant carrying firearms and
rapping about committing violent acts.304 The court held that the video’s
admission did not violate the defendant’s First Amendment rights
because the video was not used to establish the element of a crime, and
neither did the admission of the video violate Rule 403.305 While the video
certainly created the risk of undue prejudice, the defendant’s appearance
in the music video corroborated key aspects of the victim’s testimony
regarding the defendant and thus was properly admitted.306
Regarding expert evidence, in Pon,307 a healthcare fraud case, the
court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
the defendant’s proposed expert testimony from the former director of a
company that made products the defendant used on his patients that the
defendant’s treatments were suitable.308 The court upheld the trial
court’s finding that the expert’s relied upon theory lacked testing, known
or potential error rates and control standards, and acceptance within the
scientific community.309 The court also ruled that the trial court did not
err in allowing the Government to introduce rebuttal evidence of
fraudulent billings the defendant generated regarding one patient in
particular because the defendant testified that he treated patients for
reasons other than profit.310 In United States v. Bates, the court affirmed
the trial court’s exclusion of the defendant’s expert psychiatrist regarding
the defendant’s prior trauma and its potential relationship to his attack
on federal officers.311

Id. at 1264.
967 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2020).
304 Id. at 1204.
305 Id. at 1204–06.
306 Id. at 1205–06.
307 963 F.3d at 1207.
308 Pon, 963 F.3d at 1215.
309 Id. at 1220–21.
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In United States v. McLellan, the court affirmed the trial court’s
decision to allow an officer, in a felon in possession of a firearm case, to
improperly “testify as an expert” regarding the correlation between guns
and drug activity and that the defendant was selling drugs based on
finding a “sellable amount” of meth, in this case less than a gram.312 The
court held that the testimony was not expert testimony requiring the
agent’s qualification as an expert because it did not require any scientific,
technical, or specialized knowledge, but was rather “lay opinion
testimony based on his professional experiences.”313 The court
distinguished the testimony from improper expert testimony by agents
in other contexts, such as interpreting otherwise unambiguous phone
calls in drug cases.314
IV. SENTENCING
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The Eleventh Circuit issued several important opinions interpreting
and applying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In United States v.
Bazantes, the defendant, a secondary contractor, won a rare reversal and
resentencing based on the Government’s failure to prove a loss amount
for an offense that involved submitting falsified payroll forms in
connection with a contract supplying drywall workers for a federal
agency, the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC).315 The
sentencing court had based the $5 million loss amount on the contracts
the defendants had earned in connection with submitting falsified payroll
information, but there was no evidence that the CDC had suffered any
“pecuniary harm,” and it was insufficient that the defendants’ conduct
“compromised the integrity of the federal contract bidding process.”316
The court added that the CDC “would have paid the same amount and
received the same benefit” even if had stopped payment until the
defendants properly classified its employees, and to the extent there
could have been a loss, it “must be offset by the fair market value of the
services that the CDC received,” which was the “the full, bargained-for
benefit.”317

McLellan, 958 F.3d at 1113–14.
Id. at 1114.
314 Id. at 1114–15.
315 Bazantes, 978 F.3d at 1249–50.
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In another case involving loss amount, United States v. Stein,318 the
court revisited the defendant’s sentence after it had previously remanded
his case for recalculating the loss amount and “considering evidence of
investor reliance and intervening events that may have cause the stock
price to decline.”319 This time around, the court affirmed the significantly
lower loss amount, holding that the district court based the loss amount
on a reasonable methodology, not mere speculation, and that specific
circumstantial evidence of investor reliance is sufficient to prove
causation in calculating loss, notwithstanding drops in stock price and
market efficiency.320
In United States v. Cingari,321 the defendants were convicted of
falsifying federal immigration documents and mail fraud based on a
scheme of helping immigrants obtain driver’s licenses by submitting
fraudulent paperwork. In that case, the court considered whether the
sentencing court should have calculated the defendant’s Guidelines
range under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1,322 which covers fraud offenses, or
§ 2L2.1,323 which covers immigration offenses.324 The court affirmed the
sentencing court’s application of § 2B1.1 because, despite the fraud
guideline’s cross-reference to § 2L2.1 specifically, the defendants’ conduct
was “more aptly covered” by § 2B1.1, which also provided for a higher
Guidelines range.325
In Muho, a bank fraud case, the court ruled on a matter of first
impression
involving
the
enhancement
under
U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(b)(16)(A)326 for deriving more than $1 million in gross receipts
from one or more financial institutions.327 Rejecting the defendant’s
argument that the enhancement does not apply unless the financial
institution owns, invests, or has unrestrained discretion to control the
funds that are obtained through fraud, the Eleventh Circuit held that,
“at least in a case involving property held by a financial institution for a
depositor, the financial institution (1) must be the source of the property,
which we interpret as having property rights in the property, and (2)

964 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1318.
320 Id. at 1319–20.
321 952 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2020).
322 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.
323 U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1.
324 Cingari, 964 F.3d at 1304.
325 Id. at 1307.
326 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A).
327 Muho, 978 F.3d at 1220–21.
318
319

2021]

CRIMINAL LAW

1127

must have been victimized by the offense conduct.”328 The court held that
a financial institution “need not have full ownership” of the funds
obtained but must be “victimized by the [fraud].”329 The enhancement
does not apply, for example, where “the bank holds the property, but is
not the victim of the heist,” or is “just a conduit for a transfer of property
that resulted from criminal conduct directed elsewhere.”330
In United States v. Johnson,331 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
sentencing court’s total drug quantity under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1,332 which
was calculated by adding the number of marijuana packages shipped to
defendant and multiplying by the approximate quantity per package.333
While the sentencing court based these numbers on hearsay statements
made by an agent—without corroborating evidence or the opportunity to
make a credibility determination—defendant had not objected to the
number of packages sent and other evidence supporting the alleged
quantity in each package.334 The court added that a sentencing court
need not make “express findings that hearsay evidence is reliable before
it can be considered in sentencing.”335 Separately, the court affirmed
defendant’s enhancement for engaging in criminal conduct “as a
livelihood” under § 4B1.3,336 holding that a defendant can still receive the
enhancement if he has a legitimate job as long as the criminal conduct is
his primary occupation.337
In another case involving drug quantity under § 2D1.1, the court in
United States v. Delgado338 affirmed the sentencing court’s finding that
a box with a controlled substance analogue was attributable to the
defendant as “relevant conduct.”339 The defendant had ordered two boxes
from China, the first with a controlled substance analogue and the second
with an scheduled substance, and the defendant argued that his ordering
the first box was not relevant conduct because at that point he had not
known it was an illegal substance.340 Citing the Supreme Court’s holding
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1221–23.
330 Id. at 1225–26.
331 980 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2020).
332 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.
333 Johnson, 980 F.3d at 1372.
334 Id. at 1372–74.
335 Id. at 1373.
336 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.3.
337 Johnson, 980 F.3d at 1376–77.
338 981 F.3d 889 (11th Cir. 2020).
339 Id. at 899.
340 Id. at 900.
328
329
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in McFadden, the court concluded there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence that the defendant knew the substance in the first package was
illegal.341 The court also affirmed the defendant’s enhancement for
possessing a firearm in connection with a drug offense, rejecting the
defendant’s argument that the firearms were kept for sporting and
collection purposes and were not related to the shipments he ordered
from China.342 The court held that the district court properly based the
enhancement on the number of firearms and silencers in the defendant’s
safe and their proximity to other illegal substances the defendant had at
his home, which was also the intended destination of the illegal drugs he
ordered.343
The Eleventh Circuit issued several important opinions under
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1344 relating to the obstruction of justice enhancement. In
Singer,345 for example, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a defendant’s
enhancement under § 3C1.1 based on a finding that the defendant
perjured himself while testifying at his trial.346 In a trial involving illegal
exports to Cuba, defendant testified that he was hiding the exported
materials from Cuban, not American authorities, and the court found
that this testimony was perjury because the testimony was material to
his defense and “the jury chose not to believe him.”347 Defendant argued
that the sentencing court had failed to make “specific, independent
findings of perjury and instead merely found the jury’s verdict to be a
‘definitive referendum’ on the falsity of [the defendant’s] testimony.”348
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the enhancement was
properly applied because the sentencing court identified the specific
testimony it found to be false, “evaluated the materiality of that
testimony, and provided a sufficient explanation.”349
The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed an enhancement § 3C1.1 for a
doctor-defendant in a “pill mill” case, Gayden, finding that the district
court properly based the enhancement on Dr. Gayden “updating” his
patient records to reflect more due diligence in his prescribing practices

Id. at 901.
Id. at 902–03.
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after the state obtained his files through a search warrant.350 In Johnson,
a marijuana conspiracy case, the court affirmed the sentencing court’s
application of the obstruction enhancement based on Johnson’s violation
of a protective order when he took pictures of discovery materials
involving cooperators and sent them to a potential witness.351 The court
concluded that the sentencing court did not clearly err despite the fact
that Johnson eventually accepted responsibility and pled guilty.352
While the court affirmed the obstruction enhancement in Johnson, it
also issued an important ruling under § 3E1.1(b)353 on the Government’s
refusal to move for an additional one-point decrease for Johnson’s
acceptance of responsibility.354 While the court ultimately concluded the
error was not plain, it did recognize that “there [are] limits to the
Government’s discretion to withhold a motion.”355 Citing other circuits on
the issue and comparing their approaches, the court concluded that, “in
the case of a timely notification of a decision to plead guilty, it is clear
that the Government can no longer base its refusal to move for a
third-level reduction on a defendant's refusal to waive appellate rights,”
though the court left open the possibility that the Government can refuse
to move for the additional point if the defendant insists on a suppression
hearing or otherwise creates extra work for the Government356 Critically,
the court indicated the Government’s refusal based on the defendant’s
obstruction would not have been proper because the Defendant’s
violation of the protective order, “did not cause the Government
additional work. 357Nor was untimeliness in any way implicated by the
Defendant’s conduct.”358
While the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for Hobbs Act
robbery in Smith,359 it issued a noteworthy opinion in United States v.
Eason360 holding as a matter of first impression under § 4B1.2361 that
Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence.”362 The court
Gayden, 977 F.3d at 1154.
Johnson, 980 F.3d at 1369.
352 Id. at 1375.
353 U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).
354 Johnson, 980 F.3d at 1377.
355 Id. at 1377–79.
356 Id. at 1385.
357 Id. at 1384.
358 Id.
359 967 F.3d at 1200.
360 953 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2020).
361 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.
362 Eason, 953 F.3d at 1188–89.
350
351
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reasoned that, under the categorical approach, Hobbs Act robbery is not
a “crime of violence” because the offense can be committed by using,
attempting, or threatening to use force against a person’s property even
when that property “is not physically proximate to the robbery victim.”363
In United States v. Martinez,364 the court held that enhancement
under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B),365 for possessing a firearm in connection with
drug activity was appropriate where the evidence showed Martinez
intended to purchase and distribute drugs but for an intervening force,
and his “stolen shotgun had the potential to facilitate the pound-of-dope
sale” based on the defendant’s plan to sell the gun for the dope.366 In
United States v. Wilson, the court affirmed application of an
enhancement for being a “prohibited person” in possession of a firearm
based on the uncontested facts in the PSR that Wilson’s use of marijuana
occurred “during the same time period” as his possession of an
unregistered shotgun, and it was not necessary for the Government to
show he used marijuana specifically at the time he purchased the gun,
during his arrest, or “at the exact same time he possessed the firearm.”367
Last, but certainly not least, the court held in United States v.
Henry368 that the Sentencing Guidelines remain binding if the provision
in question does not enhance the defendant’s sentence or mandate the
imposition of a sentence within the guideline range.369 Here, the court
was required to impose a downward departure under § 5G1.3(b)(1)370
based on time the defendant had already served in a related state case,
and the court provided a detailed framework guiding sentencing courts
to apply mandatory downward departures after determining the
reasonable sentence under § 3553(a)371 and applicable Guidelines
range.372
B. Other Sentencing Issues
The court considered a variety of different sentencing issues in 2020.
In United States v. Grow, for example, the court vacated defendant’s
Id. at 1193.
964 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2020).
365 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
366 Martinez, 964 F.3d at 1338.
367 Wilson, 979 F.3d at 916.
368 968 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2020).
369 Id. at 1284–85.
370 U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1).
371 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
372 Henry, 968 F.3d at 1286.
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twenty-year sentence for healthcare fraud after the jury had returned
only a general verdict on count one, which charged a “dual-object
conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and wire fraud.”373 Analogizing
the case to a multi-object drug conspiracy where different drug quantities
trigger different sentencing ranges, the court held that a trial court can
only sentence a defendant for “the least serious” of the charges in a multiobject fraud conspiracy—in this case the ten-year sentence for healthcare
fraud rather than the twenty years for wire fraud—unless the court uses
a special verdict.374
In United States v. Gomez,375 the court affirmed a defendant’s sentence
for illegal reentry, which was ordered to run consecutively to a separate
eight-year sentence, holding that the proper standard of review for the
substantive reasonableness of such a sentence is abuse of discretion, not
de novo.376 Applying that standard in United States v. Harris,377 the court
held that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Harris to ninety-two months, almost three times the low end of his
Guidelines range, because it adequately explained its factual
justifications for the variance and was allowed to weigh some § 3553(a)
factors over others.378
In one of several opinions regarding the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a defendant’ sentence, the court issued a rare holding
in United States v. Green that the defendant’s sentence was procedurally
unreasonable where the district court did not identify or explain the
applicable Guideline range it calculated, despite defendant’s multiple
requests to clarify.379 Aside from reviewing sentences for reasonableness,
the court also considered in United States v. Boyd380 whether a
defendant’s appeal waiver, in a plea agreement that allowed him to
appeal if he received an above-Guidelines sentence, was ambiguous
regarding “who will calculate the guideline range.”381 The court held it
was not given the multiple warnings to the defendant that the sentencing
court would ultimately determine the Guidelines range.382
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On a related note, the Eleventh Circuit held in United States v. Hall383
that the district court only needs to provide advance notice to a defendant
if it intends to depart upwards from the Guidelines, as opposed to varying
upwards from the Guidelines based on § 3553(a) factors, and the court
may consider the defendant’s lack of remorse and any lasting effects on
his victims.384 The court also held that the sentencing court properly
based its variance on hearsay statements made by the victims and
defendant in prior civil litigation.385 The court held there was more than
sufficient “indicia of reliability” to justify the sentencing court
considering the statements, the defendant did not refute the statements,
they corroborated each other, and they were consistent with other
evidence.386
The Eleventh Circuit also reviewed restitution issues in United States
v. Goldman,387 involving the theft of a unique gold bar from a museum
by the appropriately-named Jarred Goldman.388 After a lengthy
discussion regarding how to define “value” under the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act (MVRA),389 including whether to use the fair market
value or another measure, the court concluded that, “when the loss
involves a unique item or when no ready market for it exists, fair market
value may not be an option.”390 As a matter of first impression, the court
held that sentencing court’s should base restitution for theft of unique
items on a “reasonable estimate” of its “replacement value.”391
V. POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
The Eleventh issued several important opinions involving postconviction proceedings, especially in light of the First Step Act of 2018,
which provided a variety of avenues for federal inmates to seek sentence
reductions. While this Article does not cover most of the appeals from
motions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255392 or 2254,393 it covers a few of the
court’s noteworthy opinions in other post-conviction contexts.

965 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2020).
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Regarding proceedings under the First Step Act, the court ruled in
Denson394 that defendants seeking sentence reductions under the First
Step Act are not entitled to a hearing or to be present if there is one.395
As for determining inmates’ eligibility for reduced sentences under the
First Step Act, the court engaged in a detailed discussion in United States
v. Jones396 regarding what prior convictions qualify as a “covered offense”
under the First Step Act’s provision making the Fair Sentencing Act
retroactive.397 In United States v. Taylor,398 the court held that the
defendant was eligible for a sentence reduction based on his conviction
for a crack cocaine offense that had a reduced sentencing range by the
Fair Sentencing Act,399 despite the fact that he was also convicted of other
drug offenses that carried the same, higher sentencing range.400
The court also issued some important opinions regarding supervised
release. In United States v. Hill,401 the court held that the exclusionary
rule under the Fourth Amendment does not apply to supervised release
revocation proceedings, citing Supreme Court precedent that the
exclusionary rule does not apply in the state parole revocation context.402
In United States v. Bobal,403 the court also created a circuit split where it
held that a lifelong condition of the defendant’s supervised release
limiting his ability to use the internet was valid as long as it only lasted
as long as the defendant’s term of supervised release, which here was
life.404
Finally, the court also issued a few opinions addressing uncommon
issues. Regarding the effect of a sentence commutation, the court in
Andrews v. Warden405 engaged in a technical discussion regarding
sentencing calculations and affirmed the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP)
recalculation of the defendant’s remaining time to serve where the
defendant had been serving two different terms.406 In United States v.

963 F.3d at 1080.
Id. at 1082.
396 962 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2020).
397 Id. at 1297.
398 982 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2020).
399 21 U.S.C. § 841.
400 Taylor, 982 F.3d at 1300–01.
401 946 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2020).
402 Id. at 1241–42.
403 981 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2020).
404 Id. at 976–78 (citing United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288, 290 (3d Cir. 2018)).
405 958 F.3d 1072 (11th Cir. 2020).
406 Id. at 1076.
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Abreu,407 the court affirmed the district court’s denial of a defendant’s
petition for damages after her conviction for healthcare fraud was
overturned on appeal, reasoning that the court held there was
insufficient evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but did not
“establish Dr. Abreu’s innocence.”408
VI. CONCLUSION
This concludes our tour of the Eleventh Circuit’s criminal docket in
2020. As a new presidential administration takes over, the circuit will
soon see several new faces join the bench and, with those new faces,
perhaps some new approaches to building on the court’s precedents and
further clarifying our federal criminal laws. As the court continues
working to continue developing the law, practitioners, prosecutors, and
judges are, as always, well-served to remember what came before.

407
408

976 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1265–66.

